1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3	WESTERN DIVISION
4	THE HON. GEORGE H. WU, JUDGE PRESIDING
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6	Margaret Carswell, )
7	Plaintiff, )
8	vs. ) No. CV-10-05152-GW
9	JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. ) et al., )
10	Defendants. )
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16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
17	Los Angeles, California
18	Thursday, September 30, 2010; 9:09 A.M.
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23	Wil S. Wilcox, CSR 9178
24	Official U.S. District Court Reporter 312 North Spring Street, # 430
25	Los Angeles, California 90012 Phone: (213) 290-2849

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LOS ANGELES, CA.; THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2011; 9:09 A.M.
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               THE COURT: Let me call the matter of Carswell
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     versus JP Morgan. Let me have appearance of counsel.
               MR. GILLIES: Good morning, Your Honor. Douglas
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     Gillies for the plaintiff Margaret Carswell.
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               THE COURT: All Right.
               MR. TANNATT: Good morning, your Honor.
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     Tannatt for JP Morgan and for California Reconveyance
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     Company.
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               THE COURT: All right. Let me ask counsel.
     saw the Court's tentative?
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               MR. GILLIES: Yes, Your Honor.
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               MR. TANNATT: Yes, your Honor.
               THE COURT: Does anybody want to argue anything?
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               MR. GILLIES: I have a few words, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               MR. GILLIES:
                             The issue that we are trying to
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     articulate is, if WaMu did not own the loan at the time of
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     the FDIC transfer, then Chase acquired nothing. And if
     Chase acquired nothing because WaMu owned nothing, then
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     plaintiff is entitled to find out what they based their
     claim on. It can't just be based on an order because if
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     WaMu owned nothing the FDIC transfer didn't change that.
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               THE COURT:
                           Well, let me ask the defense counsel.
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What's your response to that?
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               MR. TANNATT:
                             I don't know the basis of their
     claim that WaMu did not own anything.
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               THE COURT: Let me just ask you this. What is the
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     basis of your client's claim that it does own the
     interest -- sorry -- that WaMu did own an interest in the
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     property at the time that, that interest was purportedly
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     transferred to your client?
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                             The allegations in the complaint say
               MR. TANNATT:
     that they signed the loan agreement. She claims she
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     received $2.5 million. She has an obligation to somebody.
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     Our records show that it is to Washington Mutual Bank.
     No, she doesn't get to walk away with $2.5 million.
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14
               Thank you.
                           That's my response.
               THE COURT:
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                          Pithy.
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               MR. GILLIES: We don't argue with that.
                                                        She is
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     willing to pay whoever it is that is entitled to the money,
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     and in their files they know who that is.
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               THE COURT: Let me stop you. When you say she's
     willing to pay if she has 2.5 million, I presume that his
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     client would be ecstatic to get 2.5 million.
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                             That's correct.
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               MR. TANNATT:
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               THE COURT: So if that's the case, then why are we
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     here?
               MR. GILLIES:
                             Because she, the plaintiff, never
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contracted with Chase. Chase is now saying give us your home, and she's saying show me that you have an interest in this. I will pay the beneficiary. I will pay the owner of the loan.

THE COURT: Let me stop you. All of this stuff is recorded I presume in the county. The county has a recording as to who supposedly has an interest in the property.

MR. TANNATT: Correct. And you have taken judicial notice of the Purchase and Assumption Agreement.

THE COURT: If that is recorded that is a presumptive showing, so why isn't that sufficient?

MR. GILLIES: If the bank sells the loan and does not record that sale, the bank no longer is entitled to the funds and the person who borrowed the money is paying the wrong party. It's simply a matter of finding out who actually is entitled to the money.

Now if we were not talking about banks and mortgages it would seem perhaps a little simpler. We are in the arena in which banks are considered to be infallible.

THE COURT: No. We are not talking about that.

We are just talking about normal things. There is no

difference between the sale of the property than for example
the sale of a car. In other words, cars are normally
registered to a registered owner. They may be transferred,

and there may be some things that should be recorded that are not recorded or something of that sort.

Again, what can one say. I don't understand what the point of this lawsuit is. If your client is willing to pay the outstanding amount to someone, what she could simply do is she could do an interpleader at this point. Deposit the money in this Court and say, you know, give me my title to my house free and clear and let me have everybody who potentially might have a claim fight it out between themselves.

MR. GILLIES: I suppose, but when you have someone coming in and saying give me your house, she also has the option to say do you have a right to this.

THE COURT: Well, look at the recorded ownership, and the answer would be if the recorded ownership is there in the county --

MR. GILLIES: But we have also alleged that the other documents that are being recorded show that WaMu transferred all of its interests.

THE COURT: To whom?

MR. GILLIES: To the trust that I described. I don't have it memorized, but within days of this transaction their interests had already been transferred to a pool of investors. So what did they keep?

If they merely retained the servicing rights, if

their only role -- and this is true of most loans. If their only role is to collect the money and send it to somebody else, we just want to know who that is. Does Chase have any idea? Did WaMu keep those records?

To say that everyone has to keep paying the bank when what happened was the banks mostly sold all of their interests to other investors makes no sense. Why would somebody pay somebody that has no claim to the property?

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. It's quite common that when one gets a mortgage part of the documents that you sign indicate that the financial institution which is initially lending the money is free to assign its rights, et cetera, et cetera, to anyone, and so what difference does it make.

MR. TANNATT: Yes, Your Honor. If I may be heard. Part of all mortgages is you have the trustee, you have the servicer and you have the beneficiary.

In this particular case, yes, it's right. The beneficiary rights were securitized. In the Opposition of the Motion to Dismiss there is several authorities that, that has not been held to be a particularly good point to not pay your mortgage payment, which apparently is the point.

In her declaration -- if I may just read it into the record -- at paragraph 10 she says: I made regular

monthly payments to the bank, was never late with a payment and I have no other debt. I stopped making payments to Chase bank in December 2009 when the research I had begun two months earlier started to reveal non-disclosed securitization of my mortgage and many irregularities departing from usual.

Then in paragraph 11 it appears that what she's protesting by not paying her mortgage obligations was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.

Now I've read a fair share of complaints as to why people are not making their payments, but as a protest on the Glass-Steagall Act this, Your Honor, is a first.

THE COURT: Well, let's put it this way. Her protest may have unfortunate consequences.

Let me just ask the plaintiff's counsel. I have issued a tentative here. You haven't given me any reason why I shouldn't make my tentative my final. The question is whether or not I'm going to give you leave to amend.

MR. GILLIES: Right. We went into the question of whether WaMu owned anything at the time that Chase acquired rights, and that's what we've been arguing.

The other side of the argument is that if a contract is formed and one party intends that the other one will fail, can that possibly be a contract. That's an important question of law.

THE COURT: What is the difference between that 1 2 and a pawnbroker's arrangement? MR. GILLIES: Well, I don't know. 3 4 THE COURT: Are pawnbrokers' deals illegal? 5 other words, the pawnbroker always gives you much less money than the thing's worth. And they are hoping that you take 6 the money and you spend it on dope and die. Does that mean that the contract that's formed is not enforceable? 8 MR. GILLIES: No. They may hope that you don't 9 come back and buy it back --10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. GILLIES: -- but if their intention -- when I 12 say you and I have a contract, we are going to exchange 13 14 promises and we are going to exchange consideration --THE COURT: Let me stop you. The only thing that 15 you have is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 16 17 other words, you cannot impede the other side from getting the benefit of the contract, but the mere fact that you 18 19 enter into a contract, it's also like life insurance. MR. TANNATT: And again, if I just may be heard. 20 In paragraph 10 --21 22 THE COURT: Yes. MR. TANNATT: -- it had nothing to do with the 23 24 actions of Chase or Washington Mutual. It was the repeal of

the Glass-Steagall Act. It has not been alleged that Jammie

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Diamond of Chase or anyone at WaMu had anything to do with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Understand, this is her declaration. She made it under oath of perjury.

MR. GILLIES: Regardless of the Glass-Steagall
Act --

THE COURT: Actually, let's not spend too much more time on this. You have some interesting arguments, but other than the fact that they are interesting they are not particularly persuasive. So the real question that I want you to address is should I be granting the motion to dismiss with leave to amend or without leave to amend?

Do you have something else that you want to raise that you have not had an opportunity to raise?

MR. GILLIES: Yes. There is a couple of things.

THE COURT: Don't do it orally here because I'm not going to make a ruling on the presentation.

MR. GILLIES: Okay.

THE COURT: The only question is what are those additional things that you want to argue?

MR. GILLIES: Number one, this foreclosure commenced on the basis of declarations. Yesterday, Chase admitted that they had filed fraudulent declarations or affidavits in 56,000 foreclosures. The presumption that those declarations are accurate is out the window. Nothing like that has happened before.

They have admitted that they are stopping 56,000 foreclosures because the people signing the declarations had no personal knowledge of what they were signing.

Declarations are required under California law to commence a foreclosure. So certainly, we want to amend to include that.

THE COURT: Let me stop you and let me ask. What difference does it make in this case since obviously your client has already admitted the basis for the foreclosure is because she stopped paying the mortgages? It's not a situation where they need anybody to file a declaration to that effect because she's already admitted it.

MR. GILLIES: Last Friday Attorney General Brown ordered a halt to all foreclosures in California by GMAC because of their declarations.

THE COURT: If there's been a halt in the foreclosures, then there has been a halt in the foreclosures. This Court does not do foreclosures because this Court is not a state court. In fact, the foreclosures have been stopped, that's fine and dandy. I don't particularly care.

MR. GILLIES: He ordered that in the GMAC, but now Chase has admitted that their declarations were also based on no personal knowledge and that's necessary. So that would be one ground that I would add that I have not.

From our discussion today, I understand that I 1 2 need to be more specific in alleging that there was no contract, and I need to be more specific in alleging that 3 WaMu had no interest at the time Chase acquired assets. 4 5 This isn't a liability case. 6 THE COURT: Let me stop you. I understand what 7 you are saying. Let me ask the defense. Are you going to jump up 8 9 and down and say he can't have another chance to amend? MR. TANNATT: Well, there is a recorded deed of 10 11 trust on this, Your Honor. We do have the Purchase and 12 Assumption Agreement for which you've taken judicial notice. 13 I don't see this case going anywhere. That's my final 14 quesstimation. THE COURT: Let me do this. I will give him one 15 16 more chance, but I agree with you it should be only one more 17 chance if that. I will give him until the 15th of October 18 to file something. 19 MR. GILLIES: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: And serve it on the same day. 20 right. 21 22 (Court and the clerk conferred.) THE COURT: I will set this matter for a 23 24 scheduling conference for November the 14th. And if the

defendant desires to file a motion to dismiss I will set it

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for that date as well. The parties are to agree upon a
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     briefing schedule. All right.
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               Anything else we need to talk about?
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               MR. GILLIES: No, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Have a nice day.
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              (At 9:22 a.m. proceedings were adjourned.)
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2	CERTIFICATE
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5	I hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753,
6	Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing is a true and
7	correct transcript of the stenographically reported
8	proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the
9	transcript page format is in conformance with the
10	regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
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12	Date: January 21, 2011
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16	WIL S. WILCOX
17	U.S. COURT REPORTER CSR NO. 9178
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