i	
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3	WESTERN DIVISION
4	THE HON. GEORGE H. WU, JUDGE PRESIDING
5	
6	Margaret Carswell,)
7	Plaintiff,)
8	vs.) No. CV-10-05152-GW
9	JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. et) al.,
10	Defendants.)
11)
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
17	Los Angeles, California
18	Thursday, January 6, 2011; 9:08 A.M.
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	Wil S. Wilcox, CSR 9178 Official U.S. District Court Reporter
24	312 North Spring Street, # 430 Los Angeles, California 90012
25	Phone: (213) 290-2849

1	APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
2	
3	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: DOUGLAS CRAWFORD GILLIES By: Douglas Gillies
4	Attorney at Law 3756 Torino Drive
5	Santa Barbara, CA 93105 805-682-7033
6	douglasgillies@gmail.com
7	
8	FOR THE DEFENDANTS: LAW OFFICES OF ALVARADO SMITH By: Patricio A. Marquez
9	Attorney at Law 633 West Fifth Street Suite 1100
10	Los Angeles, CA 90071 213-229-2400
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16 17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

```
LOS ANGELES, CA.; THURSDAY, JANUARY 6, 2011; 9:08 A.M.
 1
 2
                                 -000-
               THE COURT:
                           Let me call the matter of Carswell
 3
 4
     versus JP Morgan.
 5
               MR. MARQUEZ: Good morning, Your Honor.
     Patricio Marquez of Alvarado Smith for defendants JP Morgan
 6
     Chase Bank N.A. and California Reconveyance Company.
 8
               THE COURT: All right.
               MR. GILLIES: Good morning, Your Honor.
 9
     Douglas Gillies for Plaintiff Margaret Carswell.
10
11
               THE COURT: All right. Let me ask both sides.
12
     Did you see the Court's tentative ruling on this motion to
     dismiss the First Amended Complaint?
13
14
               MR. MARQUEZ: Yes, Your Honor.
15
               MR. GILLIES:
                             Yes.
16
               THE COURT: Does anybody want to argue anything?
17
               MR. GILLIES:
                             Well, I have a few problems with
     your tentative opinion, Your Honor.
18
19
               THE COURT: Well, I would expect that you did, but
     what do you want to say?
20
               MR. GILLIES: First of all, there was a request
21
22
     for judicial notice of the Congress oversight panel report
     which was cited in my opposition, so if I could ask the
23
24
     Court, would you be willing to consider giving judicial
25
    notice of that report? It was downloaded from the Congress
```

site.

THE COURT: Well, how does it relate specifically to this particular matter? I can understand, obviously, that Congress is looking into various things and, et cetera, et cetera, but what is it about the report that relates specifically to this case?

MR. GILLIES: All right. The report puts into context the conditions in which this case is one example. It shows the concern that is rising at the level of Congress to what the ramifications of these problems are.

What it basically boils down to is this: If a mortgage was created by a deed of trust and a promissory note and the promissory note disappears because it went into a securitization chain and cannot be recovered, and that could happen in one of two ways. The most common way is the securitization goes in more than one direction and so the note is lost.

In that case, it's impossible to perfect title on the completion because there is no ability to deliver the promissory note back to the trustor or to the purchaser, and so what the COP report is saying is that we are entering into a time in which real property rights in this country will be --

THE COURT: Why would that argument relate to this particular case?

MR. GILLIES: Because as we show in our complaint, the note was securitized almost immediately after the documents were --

THE COURT: Let me stop you. Is your client going to be paying off the loaned amount?

MR. GILLIES: Well, if the loaned amount has been paid back, under the --

THE COURT: Well, if that were the case, then it would be in a different situation. In other words, again, the problem is, is that your clients, it's my understanding, hasn't been making any of the payments.

MR. GILLIES: But she has alleged that the payment has been made, that the lender has been paid in full.

THE COURT: Yes. But not by her.

MR. GILLIES: No. But, for example, if I owe a thousand dollars to American Express and somebody else sends that check in and they get their money, they can't turn around and come after me anyway and say, well, we got the money but we didn't get it from you so you still owe us. And that's not the case.

THE COURT: No, that's pretty much the fact. If A owes B a thousand dollars and A says, well, B, you got a thousand dollars from A yesterday and, therefore, I don't have to pay you the amount I owe, normally it behooves A to establish the fact that, in fact, B received the thousand

dollars for A's debt.

MR. GILLIES: Yes. And that's what we are alleging, that the investment pool was paid in full for Margaret Carswell's debt. That's specifically alleged in the complaint.

THE COURT: Well, let me hear a response from the defense counsel.

MR. MARQUEZ: Certainly, Your Honor. I think what plaintiff is confusing here is, on the one hand, plaintiff undertook an obligation to borrow \$2.5 million. She has not satisfied the obligation to repay that debt. That is entirely distinct from the lender's right to sell the note off to someone else in exchange for money. The one does not excuse the other.

So I think the court has hit the nail on the head here. Plaintiff does not allege that she has satisfied her obligations under the note such that the deed of trust should be wiped out and absent that allegation. I don't think that there is any claim in addition to all of the reasons that the court has set out in this tentative ruling and for all the reasons that the court set forth in its prior ruling on the prior motion to dismiss that there isn't a factual basis to support any of plaintiff's claims.

THE COURT: Again, it seems to me that I understand -- I understand your citation to this

Congressional material, but, again, the Congressional material doesn't relate to this particular case specifically and you haven't shown that it does.

MR. GILLIES: Well, there are two sides to the argument. One is that the lender, the one who is identified in the deed of trust and the promissory note as the one who is entitled to the money has been paid. That's one allegation. The other --

THE COURT: Not by your client, though. Why is your client claiming that there has been some sort of payment that relates to her debt?

MR. GILLIES: Because that is --

THE COURT: In other words, what you are saying is that if a lender lends money to someone and if the lender sells that particular debt to someone else, that that would extinguish the obligation of the borrower because of the fact that the lender got paid some money already and so, therefore, the debt is extinguished. In other words, the debt cannot be transferred in any way.

MR. GILLIES: Now I see the problem. It's the use of the word lender. Chase does not allege in this case that it's a lender. It says that it's a servicer. WaMu, though it arranged the deal, was not the lender. It was merely a servicer. The lender was the investment trust.

When we say the lender has been paid, we mean the

investment trust. They have been paid in full and they have been paid in full for Margaret Carswell's debt. And so they have been paid.

The second part of the argument --

THE COURT: Let me stop you. I understand that point.

Let me ask the defense counsel. What is your response to that?

MR. MARQUEZ: There is no allegation in the complaint and I have no basis to believe that there can be that any entity that may have purchased the note and deed of trust from Washington Mutual Bank did so in full repayment of plaintiff's obligations under the note or deed of trust, and I think that's what's missing here.

I don't have the particular citation in front of me, but I am fairly certain that the deed of trust and possibly even the note indicates that the note may be sold at some point in time without notice to plaintiff.

That was set forth from the outset, and, again, plaintiff appears to be conflating her obligations, her personal obligations undertaken in exchange for the money that she plainly received with the lender and/or servicer's right to sell off the note to an investor.

THE COURT: Let me just stop you at this point in time. Frankly, again, what you are arguing now isn't

```
1
     contained in any pleading.
 2
               MR. GILLIES: It's in Paragraph 57 of the
     complaint.
 3
                           Well, not really, not as you are
 4
               THE COURT:
 5
     currently stating or attempting to state it.
                             That's where we say that beneficiary
 6
               MR. GILLIES:
 7
     has been paid in full.
                             That's the language --
 8
               THE COURT: Well, by whom?
 9
               MR. GILLIES:
                             That's what we need to discover.
     don't have any of those facts. They have all of the
10
     documents. We don't.
11
12
               THE COURT: Let me ask you. In other words, what
     you are basically saying is that if somebody files a
13
14
     complaint that says A has failed to pay a loan -- or, no,
     actually you are the plaintiff so the plaintiff is saying
15
     that what? I want to sue the lender because I've paid off
16
     the loan and the lender has said there is no -- it's not
17
18
     even that.
                 I mean, this is sort of strange.
19
               Let's take a look at -- you said paragraph 56?
               MR. GILLIES:
                             57.
20
               THE COURT: 57, okay. Paragraph 57 says WaMu
21
     securitized plaintiff's single-family residential mortgage
22
     loan through Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities
23
24
     Corporation. Plaintiff is informed and believes that
```

WaMu Mortgage passers through certificate series 2007-0A1

25

trust described in Paragraph 12 is terminated and the lawful beneficiary has been paid in full.

That is not sufficient.

MR. GILLIES: Well, that's what we are alleging, that the beneficiary has been paid in full. Not the servicer. We are not saying that Chase has been paid in full. They are just the servicer. That's all they call themselves.

They are working for someone else. They are not the lender. They don't get the money, but they are refusing to identify who the lender is. They are just saying give us the money because we are the servicer like an agent working for a percent. I think it's 2 percent. And so they are saying give us the money even though our beneficiary has been paid.

THE COURT: Again, this is like a lender saying, you know, you can't recover on this debt -- sorry, the borrower is saying to the lender you can't recover on this debt because you've already been paid, I think, by someone else. That normally doesn't cut it.

Normally, you have to say either I paid, in which case it's based on the party's own knowledge, or you could say you have been paid by X person. You can't say I think you have been paid.

MR. GILLIES: Well, the document, this isn't

11

something that we have to look the code for. The deed of 1 2 trust is what specifies the agreement between the parties. And the deed of trust, I do have copies that I can 3 In fact, I guess, since we are talking about it, 4 introduce. I should. So I would like to introduce these documents. 5 THE COURT: Well, again, this is a motion to 6 7 dismiss as insufficiency of the allegations of pleadings. In other words, if you want me to take judicial notice of 8 9 something, I can take judicial notice of it. And if it is something that is a document which 10 has been referenced in the pleadings that has not heretofore 11 12 been provided to the court, well, you can provide it to the court and I will take a look. 13 MR. GILLIES: Okay. I do have it. Let me just 14 since I've got this in front of me, can I just mention 15 that --16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. GILLIES: -- the deed of trust in 18 19 Paragraph 23 -- this is the only agreement that shows what the obligations are between the parties. It says that upon 20 payment of all sums secured by this security instrument, 21 22 lender shall request trustee to reconvey the property. doesn't say paid by whom. It simply says in that deed of 23 24 trust payment of all sums secured by the security agreement.

And we have alleged that those payments have been made.

25

THE COURT: By whom?

MR. GILLIES: I don't know, but that was the basis for the termination.

THE COURT: In other words, I can go back to my lender on my home mortgage and say I don't think I need to pay anymore because you've already been paid.

MR. GILLIES: Well, you could under your security agreement.

THE COURT: And then I'd lose my home. I mean, these are the consequences of saying that you've already been paid by someone else without attempting to identify who or what it is. Normally, debts of one aren't paid by other people.

MR. GILLIES: Well, in the events being described by the Congressional oversight panel, that has happened many times.

THE COURT: In other words, Congress has found that debts of borrowers in the residential market have been paid off by persons unknown to them and that was a Congressional finding?

MR. GILLIES: No. Actually, a lot of that payment came from Congress from our taxes. That's why COP was formed, because Congress put almost a trillion dollars into Wall Street, and that money was, a lot of it, going to pay off those debts to the investors.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MARQUEZ: I think I will go home and call my lender and see if I can get a full reconveyance of the deed of trust and title it back to me.

THE COURT: Let me do it this way. I will grant the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. I will allow the plaintiff to make an offer of proof as to how you would attempt to amend the first amended complaint in a way which will satisfy the court's problems that I've raised both in this motion to dismiss and the earlier motion to dismiss, and I will take a look at it.

If I find that there is something that might give me pause to say that your client has a basis to go forward, I will then allow the defense counsel to respond and I will hold another hearing. If I decide that it's not sufficient, I will dismiss with prejudice. But I will give you one more chance to give me an offer of proof in this regard.

MR. GILLIES: Then I will provide the deed of trust at that time, not now.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine.

MR. MARQUEZ: Your Honor, if I may for the record, defendants do object to that on the basis that, A, the order granting the original motion to dismiss, the original complaint was very clear. It was very clear in that it was only giving plaintiff leave to amend to cure the failed

defects in that pleading.

Plaintiff had the opportunity to do so, essentially ignored the court's order, really didn't cure or address those deficiencies. We have pointed that out in a second motion to dismiss. The court has had an -- sorry, plaintiff has had an opportunity to respond yet again in opposition.

THE COURT: Let me stop you. I understand the situation, but I'm in the Ninth Circuit.

MR. GILLIES: I can read your order if you like. It doesn't say anything like that.

THE COURT: Well, again, I've given you leave to file something new and I will take a look at it at that point in time.

Let me ask. How long do you think it will take for you to do that?

MR. GILLIES: Well, given this month, I hope I have till the end of the month.

THE COURT: I tell you what. I will give you until the 28th of January and I will set this matter back on calendar for a tickler date of February the 7th, but that's a nonappearance. I will hopefully let you know within that week whether or not I will require some response from the defense or whether or not I'm going to issue the dismissal without leave. All right?

```
1
               MR. MARQUEZ: Just to clarify, Your Honor.
 2
               THE COURT: Yes.
               MR. MARQUEZ: Plaintiff is receiving essentially
 3
     leave to file a sur-reply brief of sorts?
 4
               THE COURT:
                           No. I'm allowing him to make an offer
 5
     of proof as to how he would amend the first amended
 6
 7
     complaint to get around the problems that I've already
     pointed out. Okay?
 8
 9
               MR. MARQUEZ:
                             Understood.
10
               MR. GILLIES:
                             Thank you, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
11
12
               MR. MARQUEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
13
14
              (At 9:25 a.m. proceedings were adjourned.)
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	000
2	CERTIFICATE
3	
4	
5	I hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753,
6	Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing is a true and
7	correct transcript of the stenographically reported
8	proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the
9	transcript page format is in conformance with the
10	regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
11	
12	Date: January 21, 2011
13	
14	
15	
16	WIL S. WILCOX
17	U.S. COURT REPORTER CSR NO. 9178
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	