1	DOUGLAS GILLIES, ESQ. (CA 53602)	
2	douglasgillies@gmail.com	
3	3756 Torino Drive   Santa Barbara, CA 93105	
4	(805) 682-7033	
5	Attorney for Plaintiff	
6	MARGARET CARSWELL	
7		
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
10		
11	MARGARET CARSWELL,	) Case No. CV 10-5152-GW (PLAx)
12	Plaintiff,	) )
13	V.	OFFER OF PROOF
14	JP MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,	DATE: February 7, 2011
15	CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE CO., and DOES 1-150, inclusive,	) TIME: no hearing scheduled ) ROOM: 10
16	Defendants.	JUDGE: Hon. GEORGE H. WU
17		) )
18		) )
19		,
20		
21	Plaintiff respectfully submits this Offer of Proof as to the First Amended	
22	Complaint pursuant to the Court's Order on January 6, 2011. The allegations in the	
23	First Amended Complaint (FAC) and this Offer of Proof are based upon information	
24	and belief, except those allegations that pertain to MARGARET CARSWELL,	
25	which are based on personal knowledge. Allegations stated on information and	
26	belief are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further	
27	investigation and discovery. An offer of proof ordinarily follows discovery and oral	
28	examination of witnesses. It is challenging to make an offer of proof at the outset.	

before the Defendants have filed an answer or responded to any request. Defendants did not even reply to Plaintiff's Qualified Written Request (Plaintiff's **Exhibit 5**).

3

4

1

2

### The Promissory Note and Deed of Trust define the rights of the parties.

5 6 7

In California, an obligation arises either from the contract of the parties or by operation of law. Cal. Civ Code §1428; Cal. Code Civ Proc. §26. A mortgage is a contract. Civ. Code §2920(a). A power of sale is conferred on the mortgage, trustee, or other person *by the mortgage*. Civ. Code §2924.

8

10

11

The Adjustable Rate Note attached to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint as **Exhibit 1** identifies Washington Mutual Bank as the Lender in Paragraph 1, which then says, "The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the "Note Holder."

1213

The Note states in paragraph 7(C):

1415

written notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a certain date, the Note Holder may require me to pay immediately the full

Notice of Default. If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a

17

16

amount."

18 19 So the Note gives the right to collect, if timely payments are not made, to the Lender and anyone who takes the Note by transfer. This does not include a servicer who is not the holder of the Note.

2021

22

Plaintiff's Deed of Trust, dated 12/20/2006, ("DOT") is attached hereto as **Exhibit 12**. The "Lender" identified in the DOT is WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (page 1, paragraph C). The "Trustee" is California Reconveyance

2324

Company. (page 2, paragraph D).

2526

Consistent with the language of the Note, only the Lender is authorized under the DOT to accelerate the loan:

27

"Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower's breach of any covenant of agreement in this Security

28

Instrument...

"If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of Lender's election to cause the Property to be sold. Trustee shall cause this notice to be recorded in each county in which any part of the Property is located." (DOT page 13, paragraph 22).

Washington Mutual Bank remained the Lender for no more than a few days until it sold the loan. Thereafter, it was a servicer of the loan. The Note Holder was presumably the investment trust that put up the money.

"Lender, at its option, may from time to time appoint a successor Trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder by an instrument executed and acknowledged by Lender and recorded in the office of the Recorder of the county in which the Property is located." (DOT page 13, paragraph 24).

Defendants ask the Court's blessing to proceed with foreclosure of Plaintiff's property even though they cannot tell the Court who the Lender might possibly be.

# **Evidence of Wrongful Foreclosure**

On September 2, 2009, CRC recorded an Assignment of Deed of Trust (Plaintiff's **Exhibit 2**, attached hereto) by which JPMorgan Chase, as successor in interest to Washington Mutual, transferred all beneficial interest in Plaintiff's Deed of Trust to Bank of America.

No subsequent assignments have been recorded since September 2, 2009. CRC transferred all of its beneficial interest to Bank of America on September 2, 2009, so it was not authorized to initiate foreclosure against Plaintiff on March 31, 2010, when it recorded the Notice of Default (Plaintiff's **Exhibit 4**), and it was not acting for the Lender when it filed the Notice of Trustee's Sale on July 1, 2010 (**Exhibit 6**).

The language of the Assignment of Deed of Trust (Ex. 2) is identical to an assignment considered by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the recent case of

U.S. Bank National Association vs. Ibanez Case No. SJC-10694 (January 6, 2011). The DOT in Ibanez was assigned with the following language: "FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby grants, assigns and transfers to \_\_\_\_\_ all beneficial interest under that certain Mortgage..." (Ibanez fn. 11). Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 reads, "FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby grants, assigns and transfers to Bank of America...all beneficial interest under that certain Deed of Trust..." The only difference was the blank assignment presented in Ibanez.

The identical language of the assignments of these two mortgages points to a dichotomy in the field of securitization and pooling of mortgage-backed securities. Promissory notes and mortgages are governed by the real estate laws of 50 states, but securities questions tend to be subject to the laws of the state of New York, where most issuing trusts are domiciled and conduct their business. *Ibanez* rejected the use of blank assignments of interests in real property and noted that in Massachusetts, a non-judicial state, "one who sells under a power of sale must follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid execution of the power, and the sale is wholly void." *Moore v. Dick*, 187 Mass. 207, 211 (1905). The power of sale contained in a mortgage "must be executed in strict compliance with its terms." *Roche v. Farnsworth*, 106 Mass. 509, 513 (1871).

*Ibanez* continued, "Where mortgage loans are pooled together in a trust and converted into mortgage-backed securities, the underlying promissory notes serve as financial instruments generating a potential income stream for investors, but the mortgages securing these notes are still legal title to someone's home or farm and must be treated as such...A judge is entitled to ask for proof that the foreclosing entity was the mortgage holder at the time of the notice of sale and foreclosure, or was one of the parties authorized to foreclose...

"We agree with the (trial) judge that the plaintiffs, who were not the original mortgages, failed to make the required showing that they were the holders of the mortgages at the time of foreclosure. As a result, they did not demonstrate that the

1

2

3

4 5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21 22

23

24 25

26

27 28

foreclosure sales were valid to convey title to the subject properties, and their requests for a declaration of clear title were properly denied."

In Dexia Holdings v. Countrywide Financial Corp, No. 650185, New York State Supreme Court (Manhattan), filed on January 24, 2011, Bank of America, Countrywide, and former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo are charged by a dozen institutional investors with massive fraud for misleading investors about mortgagebacked securities.

The 194-page *Dexia* complaint alleges:

- H. Countrywide Failed To Ensure That Title To The Underlying Loans Was Effectively Transferred
- 146. An essential aspect of the mortgage securitization process is that the issuing trust for each MBS offering must obtain good title to the mortgage loans comprising the pool for that offering. This is necessary in order for the MBS holders to be legally entitled to enforce the mortgage loans in case of default. Two documents relating to each mortgage loan must be validly transferred to the trust as part of the securitization process – a promissory note and a security instrument (either a mortgage or a deed of trust).
- 147. The rules for these transfers are governed by the law of the state where the property is located, by the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement ("PSA") for each securitization, and by the law governing the issuing trust (with respect to matters of trust law). Generally, state laws and the PSAs require the promissory note and security instrument to be transferred by indorsement, in the same way that a check can be transferred by indorsement, or by sale. In addition, state laws generally require that the trustee have physical possession of the original, manually signed note in order for the loan to be enforceable by the trustee against the borrower in case of default.
- 150. The applicable state trust law generally requires strict compliance with the trust documents, including the PSA, so that failure to comply strictly

2 3

with the timeliness, indorsement, physical delivery, and other requirements of the PSA with respect to the transfers of the notes and security instruments means that the transfers would be void and the trust would not have good title to the mortgage loans.

151. The Offering Documents for each offering of the Certificates represented in substance that the issuing trust for that offering had obtained good title to the mortgage loans comprising the pool for the offering. In reality, however, Countrywide routinely failed to comply with the requirements of applicable state laws and the PSAs for valid transfers of the notes and security instruments to the issuing trusts.

The authority to foreclose against Plaintiff Margaret Carswell was assigned by CRC to Bank of America and the assignment was recorded on September 9, 2009. Almost a year later, CRC recorded a Notice of Default followed by a Notice of Trustee's Sale against Plaintiff's Property. Defendants offer no evidence that they were authorized by the Lender or the Note Holder to initiate foreclosure, as required by the Deed of Trust. Plaintiff's search of the Santa Barbara County Records reveals no Assignment of Deed of Trust from Bank of America to CRC, and her interview of Bank of America manager, Jason Moumtzoglou, revealed that Bank of America has no interest in Plaintiff's mortgage or Note.

#### **Evidence of Fraud**

CRC recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale ("NOTS") on July 1, 2010 (FAC ¶14). The NOTS, attached hereto as **Exhibit 13**, includes a declaration of compliance with Cal. Civil Code 2923.5 bearing a signature of Deborah Brignac, Vice President, California Reconveyance Co.

Attached hereto as **Exhibit 14** is a NOTS describing Plaintiff's Property recorded seven months earlier on December 7, 2009. The declaration bears a

3 4

1

2

5 6

7 8

9

10 11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21 22

23 24

25

26 27

28

distinctly different signature of Deborah Brignac, Vice President, California Reconveyance Co. At least one of the signatures is a forgery.

Three other NOTS are attached hereto announcing sales of other properties in Santa Barbara County. All of Deborah Brignac's signatures are obviously different:

- Exhibit 15 recorded Oct. 1, 2009 by CRC re: Trustee Sale No. 735164CA
- Exhibit 16 recorded Oct. 6, 2009 by CRC re: Trustee Sale No.236466CA
- Exhibit 17 recorded Oct. 7, 2009 by CRC re: Trustee Sale No.436468CA

Each of Deborah Brignac's signatures appears to be a forgery. It is possible, but not likely, that one of them is authentic. Plaintiff offers certified copies of the above exhibits and is prepared to introduce fourteen other certified copies of notices of trustee's sales recorded against various properties in Santa Barbara County with attached declarations bearing differing signatures of Deborah Brignac. The evidence suggests that defendants were running a criminal enterprise involving fraudulently manufactured recorded documents to speed the foreclosure process. Plaintiff offers Exhibits 13-17 as evidence that the pending foreclosure of her Property is illegal.

## **Unjust Enrichment**

After finding the Assignment of Deed of Trust to Bank of America, signed on September 1, 2009 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) in the County Records, Plaintiff googled "WaMu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2007-OA1 Trust" in 2010 and found evidence that the Trust was terminated on October 15, 2010. The first item in the Google search results, attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit 18, states: "Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-OA1. Termination Date: October 15, 2010. Unrealized Appreciation, \$4626 ..."

Attached hereto as Plaintiff's **Exhibit 19** are excerpts of Form 8-K, the Pooling and Service Agreement (PSA) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. for WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-OA1 Trust. WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007OA1 Trust is a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit ("REMIC Trust"). This lengthy document of 226 pages is available at the SEC website. Exhibit 19 includes:

- (1) the first two pages;
- (2) a page from the Table of Contents indicating that ARTICLE IX TERMINATION consists of §§ 9.01-9.03 on pages 122-125; and
  - (3) the complete text of Article IX, §§ 9.01-9.03.

Exhibit 19 states on the cover sheet that the Pooling and Servicing Agreement that established the REMIC Trust was dated January 1, 2007. The pool was closed on or before January 25, 2007, the date of the 8-K Report. Plaintiff's Note was therefore transferred to the REMIC Trust before January 25, 2007. Her Deed of Trust was not transferred until September 1, 2009. Exhibit 2 begins, above the document title:

#### IMPORTANT NOTICE

NOTE: After having been recorded, this Assignment should be kept with the Note and the Deed of Trust hereby assigned.

The Note and the Deed of Trust were separated from the outset of the loan. §§ 9.01-9.03 states that the REMIC Trust shall terminate upon:

- (i) the Distribution Date immediately following the exercise by the Servicer of its purchase option set forth in the first paragraph of this Section 9.01(a), or
- (ii) the later of the final payment or other liquidation (or any advance with respect thereto) of the last Mortgage Loan owned by the trust...and the payment to the Certificateholders (sic) of all amounts required to be paid to them hereunder.

So the trust terminates when the Certificate holders are paid. Exhibit 18 tends to show that the Certificates Series 2007-OA1 Trust has terminated, a matter which

must be explored in discovery, since Chase holds all the cards and has offered nothing but a purchase and assumption agreement to justify taking money and real property. If the lenders have been paid, then Chase has no basis for taking money from Plaintiff and cannot foreclose on her home. Chase is a servicer, it has never claimed to be the Lender, and their services appear to be no longer needed.

A cause of action for unjust enrichment in California is not based on, and does not arise out of, a written contract. Rather, unjust enrichment is a common law obligation implied by law based on the equities of a particular case and not on any contractual obligation. *McBride v. Boughton* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 388-389. Whether termed unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, or quantum meruit, the equitable remedy of restitution when unjust enrichment has occurred "is an *obligation* (not a true contract) created by the law without regard to the intention of the parties, and is designed to restore the aggrieved party to his or her former position by return of the thing or its equivalent in money." 1 *Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law* (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 1013, p. 1102. "The so-called 'contract implied in law' in reality is not a contract. 'Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created by law for reasons of justice.' " *Weitzenkorn v. Lesser* (1953) 40 Cal.2d 778, 794.

WaMu received the balance on Plaintiff's Note when it securitized the loan within days of its inception. (FAC ¶29). Chase describes itself in the NOTS as a servicer, not the Lender. The "Lender" appears to be the investment trust identified in the Assignment of Deed of Trust (Exhibit 2) as WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-OA1 Trust. If the trust has been terminated, the lender has been paid in full (FAC ¶57). Discovery is necessary to uncover the identity of the Lender in order to determine whether Chase has been authorized by the Lender to foreclose. If the lender has been paid, whether by government bailout or other means, payments by Plaintiff to Chase in excess of \$100,000 constitute unjust

enrichment. If Chase was not entitled to the money, it has to give it back—and no technicality can change that. Breaking with tradition, in millions of foreclosures the banks have put on masks and turned into robbers, but those days are numbered.

An individual may be required to make restitution if he is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. A person is enriched if he receives a benefit at another's expense. The term 'benefit' denotes any form of advantage. When a person has received a benefit from another, he is required to make restitution if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it. *FDIC v Dintino* (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 333, 347.

Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi released a Powerpoint presentation in January, 2011, explaining the legal issues surrounding the foreclosure crisis. The presentation illustrates examples of fraud, describes the process of securitization, and lays out some of the missteps major financial institutions have made. Portions of the Attorney General's presentation are included in Plaintiff's **Exhibit 20**, an offer of proof in graphic form to illustrate the complicated journey that Plaintiff's mortgage and note have followed down the rabbit hole of securitization through various pooling and servicing agreements.

20 Respec

Respectfully submitted,

/s/\_\_\_\_\_

Douglas Gillies Attorney for Plaintiff Margaret Carswell January 28, 2011